Can it be Morally Permissible to Assert a Falsehood in Service of a Good Cause?

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):97-109 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines three arguments that are meant to show that all intentional false assertions are intrinsically evil. The first argument holds that lying is intrinsically evil, all false assertions are lies. The second argument is that all intentional deception is intrinsically evil, and all false assertions are attempteddeceptions. Finally, I explore the argument that false assertions are intrinsically evil because they are a violation of self-unity and unity with the community. Each ofthese arguments, I hold, fails to demonstrate the conclusion which, nevertheless, may be true for other reasons not examined in this paper.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Value theory.Thomas Hurka - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 357--379.
The nature of evil.Daryl Koehn - 2005 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Naturalistic Ethics and the Argument from Evil.Mark T. Nelson - 1991 - Faith and Philosophy 8 (3):368-379.
Vagueness and Pointless Evil.Michael Schrynemakers - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:245-254.
Sceptical Theism and Divine Lies.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (4):509-523.
Soames and widescopism.David Hunter - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):231 - 241.
Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism.Peter de Marneffe - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it.Alexander Sarch - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184.
An objection to attitudinal hedonism.Peter de Marneffe - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
When does falsehood preclude knowledge?Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
Evil and a good God.Bruce R. Reichenbach - 1982 - New York: Fordham University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-09-18

Downloads
33 (#416,771)

6 months
2 (#658,848)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Kaczor
Loyola Marymount University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references