Intention, foresight, and mutilation: A response to Giebel

According to H. M. Giebel, at least three difficulties arise for my view of intention, foresight, and mutilation. First, I must either give up my account of the intention/foresight distinction or conclude that obstetric craniotomy does not constitute mutilation. Secondly, my account of the intention/foresight distinction leads to counter-intuitive conclusions such as that surgical sterilization is impermissible but removal of non-functioning limbs against the will of the possessor is morally permissible. Thirdly, she suggests that my account of mutilation is incomplete for it rests on an understanding of “health” that is not adequately specified. In this paper, I argue that my original accounts of both the intention/foresight distinction and mutilation can, nevertheless, still be defended
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DOI 10.5840/ipq20074748
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