Humanizing Personhood

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):421 - 437 (2010)
This paper explores the debate between personists, who argue that the concept of a person if of central importance for moral thought, and personists, who argue that the concept of a human being is of greater moral significance. On the one hand, it argues that normative naturalism, the most ambitious defense of the humanist position, fails to identify moral standards with standards of human behavior and thereby fails to undermine the moral significance of personhood. At the same time, it contends that a more focused attention on the morally relevant features of human life may indeed play a crucial role in enhancing our moral understanding
Keywords Personhood  Moral theory  Humanism  Personism  Moral status
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1976). Conditions of Personhood. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press

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