Reasons of the heart: Emotion, rationality, and the "wisdom of repugnance"

Hastings Center Report 38 (4):pp. 36-45 (2008)
Much work in bioethics tries to sidestep bedrock questions about moral values. This is fine if we agree on our values; arguments about human enhancement suggest we do not. One bedrock question underlying these arguments concerns the role of emotion in morality: worries about enhancement are derided as emotional and thus irrational. In fact, both emotion and reason are integral to all moral judgment.
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DOI 10.1353/hcr.0.0037
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Marta Spranzi (2012). The Normative Relevance of Cases. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (04):481-492.
Arleen Salles & Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (2012). Disgust in Bioethics. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (02):267-280.

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