Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49 (2010)
|Abstract||In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in meta-ethics and in the philosophy of mind might be more closely intertwined than philosophers in either area would like to believe.|
|Keywords||Pain Knowledge Argument Internalism about Practical Reason Bernard Williams|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Irwin Goldstein (1980). Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain. Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.
William S. Robinson (2002). Jackson's Apostasy. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.
Neil Campbell (2003). An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266.
Roy W. Perrett (1997). The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (1):49-58.
Carolyn Mason (2006). Internal Reasons and Practical Limits on Rational Deliberation. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):163 – 177.
Kevin Reuter (2011). Distinguishing the Appearance From the Reality of Pain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):94-109.
Charles Sayward (2004). Malcolm on Criteria. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):349-358.
Elijah Millgram (1996). Williams' Argument Against External Reasons. Noûs 30 (2):197-220.
Patrick Fleming (forthcoming). The Indeterminacy of Desire and Practical Reason. In David K. Chan (ed.), Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer: Philosophical Studies Series.
Stuart Rachels (2002). Nagelian Arguments Against Egoism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):191 – 208.
Added to index2009-06-06
Total downloads147 ( #3,529 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,045 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?