David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178 (2013)
Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by metaethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly farfetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems committed to its intelligibility, and, despite appearances, it isn‘t incoherent, ineffable, inherently implausible or impossible to defend. I argue that reflection on this possibility should lead us to revise our understanding of the debate between realists and antirealists. It is not only that the realist‘s semantic claim is insufficient for realism to be true, as Mackie argued; it‘s not even necessary. Robust metaethical realism is best understood as making a purely metaphysical claim. It is thus not enough for antirealists to show that our discourse is antirealist. They must directly attack the realist‘s metaphysical claim.
|Keywords||Metaethical realism moral semantics metaphysics antirealism error theory objective value|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Kahane (2012). The Value Question in Metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):27-55.
Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
Similar books and articles
Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
Sergio Tenenbaum (2003). Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
David Enoch (2009). How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism? Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15 - 50.
Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (2006). Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1. Clarendon Press 265-94.
JeeLoo Liu (2007). Confucian Moral Realism. Asian Philosophy 17 (2):167 – 184.
Elizabeth Tropman (2012). Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge? Theoria 78 (1):26-46.
David Davies (1987). Horwich on 'Semantic' and 'Metaphysical' Realism. Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557.
Simon Kirchin (2003). Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (3):241-264.
Matthew Chrisman (2005). Review of Shafer-Landau's Moral Realism. [REVIEW] Ethics 116 (1):250-255.
Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
David J. Chalmers (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press
Heimir Geirsson (2005). Moral Twin-Earth and Semantic Moral Realism. Erkenntnis 62 (3):353-378.
Aidan Lyon (2012). Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):559-578.
Added to index2011-05-14
Total downloads301 ( #8,433 of 1,941,080 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #66,697 of 1,941,080 )
How can I increase my downloads?