Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545 (2012)
|Abstract||According to Joshua Greene’s influential dual process model of moral judgment, different modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with deontological judgment, and controlled processing with utilitarian judgment. This paper aims to clarify and assess Greene’s model. I argue that the proposed tie between process and content is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence, and that the supposed evidence for controlled processing in utilitarian judgment is actually likely to reflect generic deliberation which, ironically, is incompatible with a utilitarian outlook. This alternative proposal is further supported by the results of a recent neuroimaging study we have done.|
|Keywords||Moral judgment Utilitarian judgment Dual process models Cognitive science Neuroscience|
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