Conceivability and modality in Hume: A lemma in an argument in defense of skeptical realism

Hume Studies 29 (1):43--61 (2003)
Abstract This paper examines the ramifications of Hume's view of the relation of conceivability to metaphysical possibility. It argues that the limitations Hume places of the representations involved in moves to conceivability to metaphysical possibility preclude any straightforward argument against full-blooded causal realism in Hume from conceivability. Furthermore, our finding certain states of affairs conceivable when they are not metaphysically possible is perfectly compatible with the thrust of the causal realist position.
Keywords Conceivability, Epistemology, Modality, Realism, Scepticism
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    Peter Menzies (1998). Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections. In Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
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