David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy 83 (3):311-332 (2008)
Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an 'empiricist' critique of 'rationalism'. This view is often illustrated -- or rejected -- by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical 'rationalist' is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences (among the many similarities) between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between 'rationalism' and 'empiricism', and that there is some truth in the traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called 'rationalism'
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Jason Jordan (2015). Volitional Efficacy and the Paralytic's Arm: Hume and the Discursus of Occasionalism. Intellectual History Review 25 (4):401-412.
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