Interpreting Kant's theory of divine commands

Kantian Review 9 (1):128-149 (2005)
Several interpretive disagreements about Kant's theory of divine commands (esp. in the work of Allen Wood and John E. Hare) can be resolved with further attention to Kant's works. It is argued that Kant's moral theism included (at least until 1797) the claim that practical reason, reflecting upon the absolute authority of the moral law, should lead finite rational beings like us to believe that there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and holy being who commands our obedience to the moral law and proportions happiness to virtue. Kant's apparently contradictory claims about the relationship between morality and religion reflect his view that our acceptance of the authority of the moral law is incomplete or rationally unstable absent such a theological postulate.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S136941540000203X
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,439
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1997). Things in Themselves. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):801-825.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Camillia Kong (2012). The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):661-690.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #110,842 of 1,911,606 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #321,691 of 1,911,606 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.