Philosophy of Science 60 (3):500-512 (1993)
|Abstract||R. Laudan and L. Laudan (1989) have put forth a new model intended to solve the problem of disagreement, the problem of consensus, and the problem of innovation in science. In support of this model they cite the history of the acceptance of continental drift, or plate tectonics. In this discussion, I claim that this episode does not constitute an instance of their model. The historical evidence does not support this model. Indeed, closer examination seems to weaken it. I also sketch an alternative model|
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