A quintet, a quartet, a trio, a duo? The epistemic regress problem, evidential support, and skepticism
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophia 37 (3):525-534 (2009)
|Abstract||In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values.|
|Keywords||Epistemic regress problem Epistemic justification Epistemic support Skepticism|
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