Gene concepts and Genethics: Beyond exceptionalism
Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (3) (2008)
| Abstract | The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we know about genes and what we can do with genes. The widespread notion about the exceptionality of genetic knowledge and its applicative possibilities is hardly justifiable and leads to misunderstandings regarding the conceptualization of the ethical and social problems we might face. Following a more realistic interpretation of the role of genes in human life we might avoid a whole set of fictive dilemmas and counterproductive regulatory efforts in bioethics. Bioethical discourse should move from the gene-centered scientific discourse toward the more sophisticated and complex discourses where human development represented as a matter of complex interactions between genomes and environments, between genes, educational factors, nutritional regimes, and other different developmental resources. If a gene is seen as one among the different developmental resources that are shaping a given human trait then both genethics and genetic exceptionalism could hardly be represented as a justified approach in discussing the ethical and social problems of genetics. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesThomas A. C. Reydon (2009). Gene Names as Proper Names of Individuals: An Assessment. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):409-432.
Jonathan Michael Kaplan & Massimo Pigliucci (2001). Genes `For' Phenotypes: A Modern History View. Biology and Philosophy 16 (2):189--213.
Walter Glannon (2001). Genes and Future People: Philosophical Issues in Human Genetics. Westview Press.
T. Lewens (2002). Development Aid: On Ontogeny and Ethics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 33 (2):195-217.
C. Kenneth Waters (1994). Genes Made Molecular. Philosophy of Science 61 (2):163-185.
Tareq Syed, Michael Bölker & Mathias Gutmann (2008). Genetic “Information” or the Indomitability of a Persisting Scientific Metaphor. Poiesis and Praxis 5 (3-4):193-209.
Petter Portin (2002). Historical Development of the Concept of the Gene. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (3):257 – 286.
Brant Pridmore (2008). Review of Genes in Development: Re-Reading the Molecular Paradigm. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):579-586.
Peter J. Beurton, Raphael Falk & Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (eds.) (2000). The Concept of the Gene in Development and Evolution: Historical and Epistemological Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.
Rosario M. Piro (2011). Are All Genes Regulatory Genes? Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):595-602.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads43 ( #26,104 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
