Bootstrap and rollback: generalizing epistemic circularity

Synthese 189 (2):395-413 (2012)
Abstract
Reliabilists accept the possibility of basic knowledge—knowledge that p in virtue of the reliability of some belief-producing process r without antecedent knowledge that r is reliable. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002 , Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005 ) and Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000 , J Philos 105:518–539, 2008 ) have argued that one can bootstrap knowledge that r is reliable from basic knowledge. This paper provides a diagnosis of epistemic bootstrapping, and then shows that recent attempts at embracing bootstrapped knowledge are found wanting. Instead it is argued that such arguments are afflicted by a novel kind of generalized epistemic circularity. The ensuing view is defended against various objections, and an explanation of the source of that circularity is offered
Keywords Reliabilism  Epistemic bootstrapping  Epistemic circularity
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    References found in this work BETA
    William P. Alston (1986). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
    Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
    Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
    Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

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    Matthias Adam (2004). Why Worry About Theory-Dependence? Circularity, Minimal Empiricality and Reliability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):117 – 132.
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