Color Illusion

Noûs 45 (4):751-775 (2011)
Abstract
As standardly conceived, an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception is false. Perhaps surprisingly, naïve realism provides a better account of color illusion.An apparence ymaad by som Magyk. Chaucer
Keywords color  illusion  perception  appearance  naive realism  representationalism
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References found in this work BETA
B. M. Arthadeva (1961). Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.

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