David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Review 116 (4):563-601 (2007)
Colors are sensible qualities. They are qualities that objects are perceived to have. Thus, when Norm, a normal perceiver, perceives a blue bead, the bead is perceived have a certain quality, perceived blueness. `Quality', here, is no mere synonym for property; rather, a quality is a kind of property a qualitative, as opposed to quan• titative, property. (The quantitative is a way of contrasting with the qualitative perhaps not the only way.).
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Color Illusion. Noûs 45 (4):751-775.
Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
Will Davies (2014). The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
Keith Allen (2009). Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
Hagit Benbaji (forthcoming). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
Similar books and articles
Vivian Mizrahi (2010). Color and Transparency. Rivista di Estetica 43 (1):181-192.
Jonathan Cohen (2003). On the Structural Properties of the Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):78-95.
Mohan P. Matthen (1999). The Disunity of Color. Philosophical Review 108 (1):47-84.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2008). Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405.
Peter W. Ross (2010). Fitting Color Into the Physical World. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.
Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
Mohan Matthen (2010). Color Experience: A Semantic Theory. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press 67--90.
Vivian Mizrahi (2006). Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads181 ( #8,094 of 1,725,832 )
Recent downloads (6 months)134 ( #3,676 of 1,725,832 )
How can I increase my downloads?