David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Lexington Books (2011)
This book explores classic philosophical questions regarding the phenomenon of weakness of will or ‘akrasia’: doing A, even though all things considered, you judge it best to do B. Does this phenomenon really exist and if so, how should it be explained? Nacht van Descartes The author provides a historical overview of some traditional answers to these questions and addresses the main question: how does the phenomenon of 'going against your own judgment' relate to the idea that we are rational beings? She elaborates on the notion of rational agency and shows how different types of behaviour express or fail to express our rational agency. This leads to the speculation of what is needed for akratic action to be free action. A novel position is developed, stating that certain widespread philosophical accounts of free action must conclude that 'going against your own judgment' is necessarily unfree. This also requires a reflection on possible implications for moral responsibility. Would it mean that people cannot be held accountable for irrational behaviour? Kalis offers insight on whether everyday irrational behaviour differs from irrational behaviour occurring in the context of psychiatric dysfunction, and develops a view on how we should understand ourselves when we do something other than what we judge best. Written for philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists interested in issues of irrationality and philosophy of action, this is an indispensable book for both professionals and students interested in interdisciplinary endeavours in the science of mind and behaviour.
|Keywords||irrationality weakness of will philosophy of action free action|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Alfred R. Mele (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
Gary Watson (2004). Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.
Michael Martin (1986). Defining Irrational Action in Medical and Psychiatric Contexts. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (2):179-184.
Xavier Vanmechelen (1998). Does Rationality Presuppose Irrationality. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.
Christine Tappolet (2003). Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press 97--120.
Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
A. P. Simester (1996). Agency. Law and Philosophy 15 (2):159 - 181.
Arthur F. Walker (1989). The Problem of Weakness of Will. Noûs 23 (5):653-676.
Edward Hinchman (2009). Receptivity and the Will. Noûs 43 (3):395-427.
Bruce E. Cain & W. T. Jones (1979). Modes of Rationality and Irrationality. Philosophical Studies 36 (November):333-343.
Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.) (2010). The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
Markus E. Schlosser (2007). The Metaphysics of Agency. Dissertation, St. Andrews
Robert Audi (1993). Action, Intention, and Reason. Cornell University Press.
Added to index2012-08-07
Total downloads22 ( #133,774 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #354,177 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?