Moral Fictionalism

Oxford University Press (2005)
Abstract
Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgement is belief but claim instead that it is the expression of an emotional attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivists deny that moral sentences even purport to represent moral reality and so have developed non-standard semantics for moral discourse. Mark Eli Kalderon argues for a version of non-cognitivism that eschews such controversial semantics; morality, he argues, is a fiction by means of which our emotional attitudes are conveyed. His book will be essential reading for anyone working across moral philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of language
Keywords Ethics  Philosophy
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Reprint years 2007
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Call number BJ1012.K267 2005
ISBN(s) 0199275971   9780199275977     9780199228041
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.476_6.x
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Christopher Jay (2014). The Kantian Moral Hazard Argument for Religious Fictionalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3):207-232.
Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.

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