Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference

Analysis 68 (298):133–143 (2008)
Abstract
CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our public moral utterances lack a distinctively moral subject matter and so are not answerable to the moral facts. Notice, however, that these are logically distinct claimsthe rst is a psychological claim, the second and third, positive and negative semantic claims, respectively. We can regiment the familiar technical vocabulary as follow: CHANGE..
Keywords ethics   metaethics   fictionalism
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    References found in this work BETA
    P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
    P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Edmund Dain (2012). Projection and Pretence in Ethics. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):181 - 208.
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