David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 68 (298):133–143 (2008)
CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our public moral utterances lack a distinctively moral subject matter and so are not answerable to the moral facts. Notice, however, that these are logically distinct claimsthe rst is a psychological claim, the second and third, positive and negative semantic claims, respectively. We can regiment the familiar technical vocabulary as follow: CHANGE..
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References found in this work BETA
A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
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Peter Geach (1958). Imperative and Deontic Logic. Analysis 18 (3):49-56.
Citations of this work BETA
Edmund Dain (2012). Projection and Pretence in Ethics. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):181 - 208.
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