Necessity and language: The gap is still very real

Philosophical Investigations 31 (3):227–236 (2008)
In my previous paper "Has the later Wittgenstein accounted for necessity?" I argued against the conventionalist account of necessity proposed by Wittgenstein and his followers. Glock has addressed some of my objections in his paper "Necessity and Language: In Defence of Conventionalism". This brief rejoinder considers Glock's replies to three of those objections. In the course of doing so, I revisit Wittgenstein's explanation of the special status of necessary propositions, the supposedly arbitrary nature of colour-grammatical propositions, and the relation between rules and modality.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.00345.x
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References found in this work BETA
Hans-Johann Glock (1996). Necessity and Normativity. In Hans D. Sluga & David G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press 198--225.

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