Oxford Realism: Perception

This is the third and final section of a paper, "Oxford Realism", co-written with Charles Travis. A concern for realism motivates a fundamental strand of Oxford reflection on perception. Begin with the realist conception of knowledge. The question then will be: What must perception be like if we can know something about an object without the mind by seeing it? What must perception be if it can, on occasion, afford us with proof concerning a subject matter independent of the mind?
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Mathieu Marion (2010). John Cook Wilson. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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