Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as

Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):123-144 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Two Dogmas of Coherentism.Daniel Kalpokas - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):213-236.
Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
Review of Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality[REVIEW]Richard Rorty - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (2).
John Dewey and Richard Rorty: Qualitative starting points.Ken McClelland - 2008 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (3):pp. 412-445.
The Rorty Discussion.Donald Davidson & Richard Rorty - 1997 - Philosophy International.
One Strand in the Private Language Argument.John McDowell - 1989 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 33 (1):285-303.
The Transcendental Significance of Phenomenology.Stephen L. White - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13 (1).
On not giving up the world - Davidson and the grounds of belief.Jeff Malpas - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):201 – 215.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-28

Downloads
45 (#309,587)

6 months
3 (#439,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Kalpokas
National University of Córdoba

Citations of this work

Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):36-55.
Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge.Daniel Kalpokas - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):49-70.
Naïve realism and seeing aspects.Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 43 references / Add more references