Mind 120 (478):239-262 (2011)
|Abstract||Shoemaker argues that one could not hold both that the qualitative character of colour experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the experienced colour and that there are faultless forms of variation in colour perception. In this paper, I explain what is meant by inheritance and discuss in detail the problematic cases of perceptual variation. In so doing I argue that these claims are in fact consistent, and that the appearance to the contrary is due to an optional and controversial conception of experience that should be rejected|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Georges Rey (1998). A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):435-58.
Glyn W. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch (1999). Disorder of Colour Consciousness: The View From Neuropsychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):956-957.
Stephen L. White (1986). Curse of the Qualia. Synthese 68 (August):333-68.
Kris McDaniel (2009). Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):325-331.
Sonali K. Shah & Kevin G. Corley, Building Better Theory by Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide.
Galen Strawson (1989). Red and 'Red'. Synthese 78 (February):193-232.
Michael Watkins (2008). Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2008). Martian Colours. Philosophical Writings 37.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #45,806 of 549,117 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,117 )
How can I increase my downloads?