David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280 (2008)
Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises. It turns out that each response does not fully withstand scrutiny, and so Kripke's conclusion is hard to resist. Section 1 lays out Kripke's argument, and Sections 2 to 4 then discuss responses to each of the three premises respectively.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Scott Soames (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.
George Bealer, Robert Cummings, Michael DePaul, Richard Foley, Alvin Goldman, Alison Gopnik, George Graham, Gary Gutting, Tery Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Hilary Kornblith, Joel Pust, E. Rosch, Eldar Shafir, Stephen Stitch, Ernest Sosa & Edward Wisniewkski (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas W. Polger (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.
Similar books and articles
Don Merrell (2011). Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
Colin McGinn (1977). Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.
Laurence F. Mucciolo (1975). On Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis. Philosophia 5 (October):499-506.
Murali Ramachandran (1992). On Restricting Rigidity. Mind 101 (401):141-144.
Dale Jacquette (1987). Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
Richard Double (1976). The Inconclusiveness of Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.
Fred Feldman (1974). Kripke on the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.
Michael E. Levin (1975). Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.
Olav Gjelsvik (1987). A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Argument Against Identity-Theories. Inquiry 30 (4):435 – 450.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads101 ( #24,661 of 1,725,168 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #210,933 of 1,725,168 )
How can I increase my downloads?