Aggregation and two moral methods

Utilitas 17 (1):1-23 (2005)
I begin by reconsidering the arguments of John Taurek and Elizabeth Anscombe on whether the number of people we can help counts morally. I then consider arguments that numbers should count given by F. M. Kamm and Thomas Scanlon, and criticism of them by Michael Otsuka. I examine how different conceptions of the moral method known as pairwise comparison are at work in these different arguments and what the ideas of balancing and tie-breaking signify for decision-making in various types of cases. I conclude by considering how another moral method that I call virtual divisibility functions and what it helps reveal about an argument by Otsuka against those who do not think numbers count.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820804001372
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Weyma Lübbe (2008). Taurek's No Worse Claim. Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (1):69–85.
Fiona Woollard (2014). The New Problem of Numbers in Morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):631-641.

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