Philosophia 18 (April):107-118 (1988)
|Abstract||Intentionality of cognitive states is not reducible to information if the latter is construed in terms of analytical and nomic constraints. Intentionality and the individuation of cognitive states presupposes cultural constraints that let socially constructed information flow. Fred dretske's information-Theoretical account of intentionality is criticised for ignoring the cultural constraints of human cognition|
|Keywords||Content Information Intentionality Metaphysics Object Philosophical Psychology|
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