David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 18 (April):107-118 (1988)
Intentionality of cognitive states is not reducible to information if the latter is construed in terms of analytical and nomic constraints. Intentionality and the individuation of cognitive states presupposes cultural constraints that let socially constructed information flow. Fred dretske's information-Theoretical account of intentionality is criticised for ignoring the cultural constraints of human cognition
|Keywords||Content Information Intentionality Metaphysics Object Philosophical Psychology|
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References found in this work BETA
Jon Barwise (1983). Information and Semantics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):65.
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Mit Press.
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