David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):21–39 (2000)
In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something 'in order to bring about an effect' as opposed to 'doing something because we will bring about an effect'. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ezio Di Nucci (2012). Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):662-672.
Alison Hills (2007). Intentions, Foreseen Consequences and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):257 - 283.
Alexander R. Pruss (2013). The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.
Stijn Bruers & Johan Braeckman (2014). A Review and Systematization of the Trolley Problem. Philosophia 42 (2):251-269.
By Joseph Shaw (2006). Intentions and Trolleys. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):63–83.
Similar books and articles
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Defending Double Effect. Ratio 24 (4):384-401.
Iii Get Checked Abstract Thomas J. Bole (1991). The Theoretical Tenability of the Doctrine of Double Effect. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5).
Alison Hills (2003). Defending Double Effect. Philosophical Studies 116 (2):133-152.
David K. Chan (2000). Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.
S. Matthew Liao (2009). The Loop Case and Kamm's Doctrine of Triple Effect. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):223 - 231.
Jeff McMahan (1994). Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect. Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):201-212.
P. A. Woodward (2003). Nancy Davis and the Means-End Relation. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (3):437-457.
Lawrence Masek (2010). Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
John Harris (2000). The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not Intend the Means to His End, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):41–57.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads88 ( #26,693 of 1,707,715 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #205,228 of 1,707,715 )
How can I increase my downloads?