In Critique of Pure Reason (1781)
|Abstract||_One summary of the great Kant's view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is_ _that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind_ _of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too -- but takes this situation to have nothing to_ _do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such_ _Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent_ _with determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness -- at bottom,_ _being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge,_ _quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with_ _determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists --_ _origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does_ _not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as_ _Incompatibilists certainly do._|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Edward F. Walter & Arthur Minton (1975). Soft Determinism, Freedom, and Rationality. Personalist 56:364-384.
Anatoliĭ I. Shpakovskiĭ (1963). Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism. The Hague, M. Nijhoff.
Dana K. Nelkin (2004). Deliberative Alternatives. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):215-240.
Mauro Dorato (2002). Determinism, Chance, and Freedom. In Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
David Hume (1977). 'Of Liberty and Necessity'. In Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Douglas C. Macintosh (1940). Responsibility, Freedom and Causality: Or, the Dilemma of Determinism or Indeterminism. Journal of Philosophy 37 (January):42-51.
Anatol von Spakovsky (1963). Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads122 ( #5,278 of 722,774 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,046 of 722,774 )
How can I increase my downloads?