David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Critique of Pure Reason (1781)
_One summary of the great Kant's view, to the extent that it can be summed up, is_ _that he takes determinism to be a kind of fact, and indeterminism to be another kind_ _of fact, and our freedom to be a fact too -- but takes this situation to have nothing to_ _do with the kind of compatibility of determinism and freedom proclaimed by such_ _Compatibilists as Hobbes and Hume. Thus Kant does not make freedom consistent_ _with determinism by taking up a definition of freedom as voluntariness -- at bottom,_ _being able to do what you want. This he dismisses as a wretched subterfuge,_ _quibbling about words. Rather, the freedom he seeks to make consistent with_ _determinism does indeed seem to be the freedom of the Incompatibilists --_ _origination. Is he then an Incompatibilist? Well, against that, it can be said he does_ _not allow the existence of origination in what can be called the world we know, as_ _Incompatibilists certainly do._.
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Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.
Jessica Leech (2012). Kant's Modalities of Judgment. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):260-284.
Marc Rölli (2009). Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible. Deleuze Studies 3 (1):26-53.
Kieran Setiya (2004). Transcendental Idealism in the 'Aesthetic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):63–88.
P. Bloomfield (2007). Two Dogmas of Metaethics. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):439-466.
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