David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Robert H. Kane (ed.)
Over the past three decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will motivated by a desire to reconcile a non-determinist (incompatibilistor libertarian) view of free will with modern science as well as with recent developments in philosophy. A view of free will of the kind I defend (called a “causalindeterminist” or “event-causal” view in the current literature) did not exist in a developed form before the 1980s, but is now discussed in the philosophical literature as one of three chief options an incompatibilist or libertarian view of free will might take. As such, this view has been the subject of much recent discussion. In this paper, I explain and defend my view of free will, and answer recent criticisms of it. Some of these criticisms are made by Robert Allen in his paper “Self-forming Actions,” a contribution to the seminar of which the present paper is a part. I also respond to Katherin Rogers’ contribution to this seminar “Libertarianism in Kane and Anselm.” Her book, Anselm on Freedom (forthcoming from Oxford), argues that Anselm defended a unique libertarian view of free will, avoiding both Pelagianism and Augustine’s later compatibilism, a view that she argues has affinities to my view of free will. I also discuss these affinities to Anselm in my paper and their theological and well as philosophical implications
|Keywords||Free will and determinism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$90.00 used (41% off) $120.07 new (24% off) $143.39 direct from Amazon (9% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.F75 2002|
|ISBN(s)||0631221018 9780631221012 9780631221029|
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Citations of this work BETA
Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
Bernard Berofsky (2006). Global Control and Freedom. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
David Kyle Johnson (2009). God, Fatalism, and Temporal Ontology. Religious Studies 45 (4):435-454.
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