David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121 (1999)
This paper responds to three critical essays on my book, The Significance of Free Will(Oxford, 1996) by Randolph Clarke, Istiyaque Haji and Alfred Mele (which essays appear in this issue and an earlier issue of this journal). This response first explains crucial features of the theory of free will of the book, including the notion of ultimate responsibility.The paper then answers objections of Haji and Mele that the occurrence of undetermined choices would be matters of luck or chance, and so could not be responsible actions. It then responds to concerns of Clarke that indeterminism provides no greater degree of control for defenders of incompatibilist free will and to concerns Clarke has about the notions of "effort" and "willing" in the book. Finally, the paper addresses objections of Haji concerning Frankfurt type-examples and the relation of moral responsibility to the power to act otherwise, and it addresses a concern of Mele's about why we should want a free will that is incompatible with determinism.
|Keywords||Ethics Free Will Indeterminism Responsibility Clarke, R Haji, I Mele, A|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
Galen Strawson (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Robert H. Kane (1985). Free Will and Values. SUNY Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Mirja Pérez de Calleja (2014). Cross-World Luck at the Time of Decision is a Problem for Compatibilists as Well. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.
Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2012). The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Modest Libertarianism and Practical Reason. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.
Robert Kane (2015). On the Role of Indeterminism in Libertarian Free Will. Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):2-16.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2015). Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism. Dialogue 54 (4):611-631.
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