Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and determinism

Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40 (1999)
Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.
Keywords Chance  Epistemology  Free Will  Indeterminism  Luck
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Seth Shabo (2011). Why Free Will Remains a Mystery. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
Tamler Sommers (2009). More Work for Hard Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.

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