Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413 (2002)
|Abstract||Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to Audi's intuitionism. It becomes harder to argue that there are any self-evident propositions at all, or more than just a few such propositions. It is questionable whether all moral propositions that we take an interest in are evidentially connected to self-evident propositions. It is difficult to understand what could guide the sort conceptual revision that is likely to take place in our moral theorising. It is hard to account for the epistemic value of the sort of systematicity usually praised in moral theorising. Finally, it is difficult to see what difference the truth of Audi's ethical intuitionism would make to the way in which we (fail to) handle moral disagreement.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Denis Arnold, Robert Audi & Matt Zwolinski (2010). Recent Work in Ethical Theory and its Implications for Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly 20 (4):559-581.
Robert Audi (2007). Moral Value and Human Diversity. Oxford University Press.
Vojko Strahovnik (2009). Globalization, Globalized Ethics and Moral Theory. Synthesis Philosophica 48 (2):209-218.
Robert Audi (1997). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. Oxford University Press.
Anthony Skelton (2007). Critical Notice of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):305-325.
Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
Candace Vogler (forthcoming). Some Remarks on Robert Audi's the Good in the Right. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
Robert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
Elizabeth Tropman (2009). Renewing Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #23,764 of 548,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?