David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (April):230-51 (1986)
By deliberation we understand practical reasoning with an end in view of choosing some course of action. Integral to it is the agent's sense of alternative possibilities, that is, of two or more courses of action he presumes are open for him to undertake or not. Such acts may not actually be open in the sense that the deliberator would do them were he to so intend, but it is evident that he assumes each to be so. One deliberates only by taking it for granted that both performing and refraining from any of the acts under consideration are possible for one, and that which is to be selected is something entirely up to oneself. What is it for a course of action to be presumed as open, or for several courses of action to present themselves as a range of open alternatives? Answering these questions is essential for an understanding of deliberation and choice and, indeed, for the entire issue of free will and responsibility. According to one common view, a deliberator takes the considered options to be open only by assuming he is free to undertake any of them and, consequently, that whichever he does undertake is, as yet, a wholly undetermined matter. Built into the structure of deliberation, on this theory, is an indeterministic bias relative to which any deliberator with deterministic beliefs is either inconsistent or condemned to a fatalistic limbo. An unmistakable challenge is thereby posed: is there an alternative conception of the presuppositions underlying deliberation more congenial to a deterministic perspective yet adequate to the data? Convinced that there is, I develop a partial account of deliberation that, though highly similar to the aforementioned view, diverges at a critical juncture
|Keywords||Action Choice Deliberation Metaphysics Castaneda, H|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Sofia M. I. Jeppsson (2014). Responsibility Problems for Criminal Justice. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
Philip Swenson (forthcoming). Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
Alison Fernandes (forthcoming). Varieties of Epistemic Freedom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield (2005). Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44.
Derk Pereboom (2008). A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):287 - 306.
Similar books and articles
John Ferejohn (2002). Symposium on Explanations and Social Ontology 1: Rational Choice Theory and Social Explanation. Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):211-234.
May Thorseth (2006). Worldwide Deliberation and Public Use of Reason Online. Ethics and Information Technology 8 (4):243-252.
Shane Ralston (2010). Dewey and Goodin on the Value of Monological Deliberation. Etica E Politica 12 (1):235-255.
Nishi Shah (2008). How Action Governs Intention. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (5):1-19.
Michael Byron (2001). Whose Power? Which Rationality? In Thomas R. Hensley (ed.), The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression and Order in American Democracy. Kent State University Press 68-71.
K. M. Nielsen (2011). Deliberation as Inquiry: Aristotle's Alternative to the Presumption of Open Alternatives. Philosophical Review 120 (3):383-421.
Matthew Noah Smith (2010). Practical Imagination and its Limits. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (3):1-20.
Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads72 ( #61,527 of 1,911,917 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #46,598 of 1,911,917 )
How can I increase my downloads?