Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):438-444 (2011)
|Abstract||Abstract While agreeing that dynamical models play a major role in cognitive science, we reject Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey's contention that they constitute an alternative to mechanistic explanations. We review several problems dynamical models face as putative explanations when they are not grounded in mechanisms. Further, we argue that the opposition of dynamical models and mechanisms is a false one and that those dynamical models that characterize the operations of mechanisms overcome these problems. By briefly considering examples involving the generation of action potentials and circadian rhythms, we show how decomposing a mechanism and modeling its dynamics are complementary endeavors|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Carlos Zednik (2011). The Nature of Dynamical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):238-263.
William Bechtel, Understanding Biological Mechanisms: Using Illustrations From Circadian Rhythm Research.
William Bechtel (forthcoming). Understanding Endogenously Active Mechanisms: A Scientific and Philosophical Challenge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Browse Results).
William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
Bruce Bridgeman (1998). The Dynamical Model is a Perceptron. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):631-632.
Joel Walmsley (2008). Explanation in Dynamical Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 18 (3).
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2011). Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation. Synthese 183 (3):313-338.
Carl F. Craver (2006). When Mechanistic Models Explain. Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
William Bechtel (2005). Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biol and Biomed Sci 36 (2):421--441.
Derek Harter, Arthur C. Graesser & Stan Franklin (2001). Bridging the Gap: Dynamics as a Unified View of Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):45-46.
William Bechtel & Adele A. Abrahamsen (forthcoming). Thinking Dynamically About Biological Mechanisms: Networks of Coupled Oscillators. Foundations of Science.
Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1998). Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):643-643.
Ingo Brigandt (forthcoming). Evolutionary Developmental Biology and the Limits of Philosophical Accounts of Mechanistic Explanation. In P.-A. Braillard and C. Malaterre (ed.), Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Springer.
William Bechtel (1998). Dynamicists Versus Computationalists: Whither Mechanists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):629-629.
David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver (2011). The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.
Added to index2011-04-07
Total downloads60 ( #15,965 of 549,087 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,152 of 549,087 )
How can I increase my downloads?