Decision theory as philosophy

Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577 (1983)
Abstract
Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise.
Keywords Decision making  Knowledge, Theory of  Science Philosophy
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Call number BD184.K37 1996
ISBN(s) 0521475058  
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Lara Buchak (2013). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.

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