How to demarcate the boundaries of cognition

Biology and Philosophy 27 (4):545-570 (2012)
Abstract
Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties and activities of putative components and the overall behavior of the cognitive mechanism in which they figure. Among its main advantages, this criterion is capable of (a) distinguishing components of cognition from causal background conditions and lower-level correlates, and (b) showing how the core hypothesis of extended cognition can serve as a legitimate empirical hypothesis amenable to experimental test and confirmation. Conceiving the debate in these terms transforms the current clash over extended cognition into a substantive empirical debate resolvable on the basis of evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience
Keywords Extended cognition  Embodied cognition  Mutual manipulability  Mechanism  Intervention
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Andy Clark (1999). An Embodied Cognitive Science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):345-351.

View all 24 references

Citations of this work BETA
Patrice Soom (2012). Mechanisms, Determination and the Metaphysics of Neuroscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (3):655-664.
Similar books and articles
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
Shannon Spaulding (2011). Embodied Social Cognition. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):141-162.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-02-19

Total downloads

73 ( #19,485 of 1,102,767 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #46,777 of 1,102,767 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.