David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55 (2010)
Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to Modest Probabilism meant to offer proof that Modest Probabilism is no better than its orthodox predecessor at avoiding unwarranted precision
|Keywords||Orthodox Probabilism Modest Probabilism Warrant Evidence Decision theory|
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1962). Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1952). The Continuum of Inductive Methods. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Bruno de Finetti (1937). La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives. Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 17:1-68.
Paul Horwich (1982). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Paul D. Thorn (2014). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43:283-302.
Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele (2014). Uncertainty, Learning, and the “Problem” of Dilation. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1287-1303.
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