David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Intuitively, the concept of truth occupies a substantive role in explaining the contribution of our linguistic utterances to the success of our ordinary actions. However, this claim has been denied recently by advocates of deflationary theories of truth. Although the technical details of the various deflationary theories differ, these theories agree in claiming that the concept of truth does not have a significant role in explaining success and that the utility of the truth predicate consists mainly in its being a device for expressing infinite conjunctions and disjunctions. This paper argues that deflationary accounts of the utility of truth are mistaken. Section 1 outlines a direction for developing the claim that truth plays a substantive role in explaining success. Section 2 argues that deflationary accounts of success are inadequate since they fail to distinguish between the triggering and structuring causes of an event
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Chase Wrenn (2011). Practical Success and the Nature of Truth. Synthese 181 (3):451-470.
By Nic Damnjanovic (2005). Deflationism and the Success Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.
Bruno Mölder (2008). Normativity and Deflationary Theories of Truth. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):179-193.
Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2006). Deflationism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
James O. Young (2009). Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
Jeffrey Ketland (1999). Deflationism and Tarski's Paradise. Mind 108 (429):69-94.
Timothy Bays (2009). Beth's Theorem and Deflationism. Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.
K. Brad Wray (2013). Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate. Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2007). The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 61--89.
Jeffrey Hershfield (2012). Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
Cezary Cieśliński (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability. Mind 119 (474):409-422.
James R. Beebe (2006). Reliabilism and Deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads6 ( #206,643 of 1,102,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #120,386 of 1,102,744 )
How can I increase my downloads?