David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 76 (5):797-808 (2009)
Recently, Estes and Arnold claimed to have “solved” the paradox of evolutionary stasis; they claim that stabilizing selection, and only stabilizing selection, can explain the patterns of evolutionary divergence observed over “all timescales.” While Estes and Arnold clearly think that they have identified the processes that produce evolutionary stasis, they have not. Instead, Estes and Arnold identify a particular evolutionary pattern but not the processes that produce that pattern. This mistake is important; the slippage between pattern and process is common in population and quantitative genetics and contributes to a persistent misunderstanding of the nature of explanations in evolutionary biology. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, 208 Hovland Hall, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331‐3902; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Massimo Pigliucci (2012). On the Different Ways of ‘‘Doing Theory’’ in Biology. Biological Theory 7 (4):DOI 10.1007/s13752-012-0047-1.
Jonathan Michael Kaplan (2013). Adaptive Landscapes: Concepts, Tools and Metaphors (Reviewing E.I. Svensson and R. Calsbeek (Eds.), The Adaptive Landscape in Evolutionary Biology). [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):613-616.
Similar books and articles
Pieter R. Adriaens (2007). Evolutionary Psychiatry and the Schizophrenia Paradox: A Critique. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):513-528.
Trevor Hussey (1999). Evolutionary Change and Epistemology. Biology and Philosophy 14 (4):561-584.
Mary B. Williams (1986). The Logical Skeleton of Darwin's Historical Methodology. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:514 - 521.
Wim J. van der Steen (1999). Methodological Problems in Evolutionary Biology. XII. Against Evolutionary Ethics. Acta Biotheoretica 47 (1).
Roger Sansom (2003). Constraining the Adaptationism Debate. Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):493-512.
H. Looren De Jong & W. J. Van Der Steen (1998). Biological Thinking in Evolutionary Psychology: Rockbottom or Quicksand? Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):183 – 205.
Lindell Bromham (2011). Wandering Drunks and General Lawlessness in Biology: Does Diversity and Complexity Tend to Increase in Evolutionary Systems? Biology and Philosophy 26 (6):915-933.
Bence Nanay (2004). The Structure and Significance of Evolutionary Explanations in Philosophy. In H. Carel & D. Gamez (eds.), What Philosophy is. Ccontinuum.
André Ariew (1998). Are Probabilities Necessary for Evolutionary Explanations? Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):245-253.
Jonathan Kaplan (2008). Evolutionary Innovations and Developmental Resources: From Stability to Variation and Back Again. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):861-873.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads4 ( #258,815 of 1,102,882 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #297,281 of 1,102,882 )
How can I increase my downloads?