Contrastive knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89 (2003)
We describe the three place relation of contrastive knowledge, which holds between a person, a target proposition, and a contrasting proposition. The person knows that p rather than that q. We argue for three claims about this relation. (a) Many common sense and philosophical ascriptions of knowledge can be understood in terms of it. (b) Its application is subject to fewer complications than non-contrastive knowledge is. (c) It applies over a wide range of human and nonhuman cases.
Keywords contrastive knowledge  knowledge  evidence
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PhilPapers Archive Antti Karjalainen, Contrastive knowledge
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Samuel C. Rickless (2014). The Contrast‐Insensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):533-555.

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