David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 39 (2):311-326 (2011)
This paper argues that morality depends on prudence, or more specifically, that one cannot be a moral person without being prudent. Ethicists are unaware of this, ignore it, or imply it is wrong. Although this thesis is not obvious from the current perspective of ethics, I believe that its several implications for ethics make it worth examining. In this paper I argue for the prudence dependency thesis by isolating moral practice from all reliance on prudence. The result is that in the actual world in which we live one cannot be moral unless one is prudent. In order to show that morality depends on prudence for the entire range of moral situations, we put prudence to the test against the most extraordinary of moral situations: moral dilemmas. Doing so shows that for all practical purposes moral dilemmas are prudential problems for agents, giving further support to the prudence dependency thesis.
|Keywords||Prudence Morality Prudence dependence Moral dilemmas Moral situations|
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References found in this work BETA
John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999/2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
H. L. A. Hart (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Ingram (2013). The Prudential Value of Forgiveness. Philosophia 41 (4):1069-1078.
David Kaspar (2015). How We Decide in Moral Situations. Philosophy 90 (1):59-81.
Steve Matthews (2014). The Imprudence of the Vulnerable. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):791-805.
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