How settled are settled beliefs in “the fixation of belief”?

Despite its prominence in Peirce’s best-known works, the notion of fixed, stable, or settled belief (I will follow Peirce in using these terms more or less interchangeably) has received relatively little explicit attention. Need a belief be permanently stable in order to count as fixed? Or, to take the other extreme, does a belief count as fixed as long as it is currently stable? More fundamentally, what is involved in predicating stability of a belief? Talk of stability suggests a disposition to resist being undermined, and so the question arises of how resistant to what sorts of undermining influences a belief needs to be in order to count as fixed in Peirce’s sense. Does Peirce, especially in “The Fixation of ..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.2.226
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,062
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
Aviad Heifetz (1999). Iterative and Fixed Point Common Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):61-79.
Roger Fellows (2000). Animal Belief. Philosophy 75 (294):587-599.
C. S. Peirce (1877). The Fixation of Belief. Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1--15.
Jeff Malpas (2008). On Not Giving Up the World - Davidson and the Grounds of Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):201 – 215.
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
Michael Bergmann (2006). Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

62 ( #72,561 of 1,934,588 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #145,854 of 1,934,588 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.