On field's epistemological argument against platonism

Studia Logica 96 (2):141-147 (2010)
Abstract
Hartry Field's formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism is only valid if knowledge is constrained by a causal clause. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in Liggins (2006), Liggins (2010)), Field's argument therefore fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf's earlier version.
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1967). A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
Stephen Yablo (2001). Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):72–102.
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