On field's epistemological argument against platonism

Studia Logica 96 (2):141-147 (2010)
Hartry Field's formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism is only valid if knowledge is constrained by a causal clause. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in Liggins (2006), Liggins (2010)), Field's argument therefore fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf's earlier version.
Keywords Philosophy   Computational Linguistics   Mathematical Logic and Foundations   Logic
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DOI 10.2307/40927686
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Stephen Yablo (2001). Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):72–102.
Alvin I. Goldman (1967). A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.

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