On field's epistemological argument against platonism
Studia Logica 96 (2):141-147 (2010)
| Abstract | Hartry Field's formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism is only valid if knowledge is constrained by a causal clause. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in Liggins (2006), Liggins (2010)), Field's argument therefore fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf's earlier version. | |||||||||
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