Shutters, boxes, but no paradoxes: Time symmetry puzzles in quantum theory
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):89 – 94 (2004)
| Abstract | The "N-box experiment" is a much-discussed thought experiment in quantum mechanics. It is claimed by some authors that a single particle prepared in a superposition of N+1 box locations and which is subject to a final "post-selection" measurement corresponding to a different superposition can be said to have occupied "with certainty" N boxes during the intervening time. However, others have argued that under closer inspection, this surprising claim fails to hold. Aharonov and Vaidman have continued their advocacy of the claim in question by proposing a variation on the N-box experiment, in which the boxes are replaced by shutters and the pre- and post-selected particle is entangled with a photon. These authors argue that the resulting "N-shutter experiment" strengthens their original claim regarding the N-box experiment. It is argued in this article that the apparently surprising features of this variation are no more robust than those of the N-box experiment and that it is not accurate to say that the particle is "with certainty" in all N shutters at any given time. [Enlarge Image]. | |||||||||
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J. V. Corbett & T. Durt (forthcoming). An Intuitionistic Model of Single Electron Interference. Studia Logica.
Jeffrey N. Howard, Charles G. Lambdin & Darcee L. Datteri (2007). Let's Make a Deal: Quality and Availability of Second-Stage Information as a Catalyst for Change. Thinking and Reasoning 13 (3):248 – 272.
Richard Schlegel (1970). Statistical Explanation in Physics: The Copenhagen Interpretation. Synthese 21 (1):65 - 82.
Ruth Kastner (2005). Why the Afshar Experiment Does Not Refute Complementarity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 36 (4):649-658.
W. J. (1996). The Evidential Significance of Thought Experiment in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):233-250.
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