David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):415-421 (1996)
Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer’s contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker’s criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker’s criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer’s first response is unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; (ii) the version of libertarianism he presents is fallacious, and (iii) even on the version of libertarianism he proposes, avoid ability remains a necessary condition for moral responsibility
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Daniel James Speak (1999). Fischer and Avoidability: A Reply to Widerker and Katzoff. Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):239-247.
John Martin Fischer (1995). Libertarianism and Avoid Ability. Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):119-125.
David Widerker (1995). ``Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):112-118.
David Widerker (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.
David Widerker (2009). A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
David Widerker (2006). Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.
Peter Simpson (1995). Community in a New Libertarianism: Rejoinder to Legutko. Critical Review 9 (3):427-429.
Roger Clarke (2012). How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):139-49.
David Widerker & Stewart Goetz (2013). Fischer Against the Dilemma Defence: The Defence Prevails. Analysis 73 (2):283-295.
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 251--264.
Peter Vallentyne (2006). Left-Libertarianism and Private Discrimination. San Diego Law Review 43:981-994.
James Sterba (2008). Welfare Libertarianism. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:765-770.
David Hunt (1996). ``Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker--Fischer Debate&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
Ira M. Schnall (2010). Weak Reasons-Responsiveness Meets its Match: In Defense of David Widerker's Attack on PAP. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads1 ( #415,073 of 1,096,601 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #258,571 of 1,096,601 )
How can I increase my downloads?