Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90 (1977)
|Abstract||I discuss donald davidson's argument for the psycho-Physical identity theory and contend that it fails: it relies on an implausible account of mental and physical events. Davidson proposes a linguistic test for determining whether a given event is mental or physical. I argue that the assumptions that are necessary for employing such a criterion of the mental are either false or presuppose the truth of the identity theory|
|Keywords||Causality Event Identity Theory Linguistics Mental Act Metaphysics Physical Davidson, D|
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