David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 55 (2):105–118 (2001)
In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams's argument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue theory. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter tend to vindicate the initial grounding of virtue epistemology in reliabilist intuitions. (edited).
|Keywords||belief, epistemology, RESPONSIBILITY, virtue, williams b|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Alvin Goldman (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Bernard A. O. Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Axtell (2003). Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
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