David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 55 (2):105–118 (2001)
In this paper, I propose a principle of doxastic rationality based on Bernard Williams's argument against doxastic voluntarism. This principle, I go on to show, undermines a number of notions of epistemic duty which have been put forth within the framework of virtue theory. I then suggest an alternative formulation which remains within the bounds of rationality allowed for by my principle. In the end, I suggest that the failure of the earlier formulations and the adoption of the latter tend to vindicate the initial grounding of virtue epistemology in reliabilist intuitions. (edited).
|Keywords||belief, epistemology, RESPONSIBILITY, virtue, williams b|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
Bernard A. O. Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
Alvin Goldman (1992). Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Guy Axtell (2003). Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
Similar books and articles
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Evaluating Need for Cognition: A Case Study in Naturalistic Epistemic Virtue Theory. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):227 – 245.
John Greco (2003). Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
J. Angelo Corlett (2008). Epistemic Responsibility. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Duncan Pritchard (2003). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
Alan Thomas (2008). The Genealogy of Epistemic Virtue Concepts. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):345-369.
R. Audi (2001). Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief. In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justiﬁcation, Responsibility, and Virtue.
Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.) (2001). Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Linda Zagzebski & Abrol Fairweather (eds.) (2000). Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #90,647 of 1,934,364 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #91,777 of 1,934,364 )
How can I increase my downloads?