David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):185-216 (2014)
Kant and Nietzsche are typically thought to have diametrically opposed accounts of willing: put simply, whereas Kant gives signal importance to reflective episodes of choice, Nietzsche seems to deny that reflective choices have any significant role in the etiology of human action. In this essay, I argue that the dispute between Kant and Nietzsche actually takes a far more interesting form. Nietzsche is not merely rejecting the Kantian picture of agency. Rather, Nietzsche is offering a subtle critique of the Kantian theory, denying certain aspects of it while preserving others. On a standard reading, the Kantian theory of willing is committed to three claims: (1) choice causes action, (2) motives do not determine choice, and (3) reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. I argue that Nietzsche accepts claims (1) and (2) while denying claim (3). I show that Nietzsche's denial of (3) is premised upon a sophisticated conception of motivation. I contend that Nietzsche's denial of (3) leads him to a new model of reflective agency. This model preserves certain Kantian insights about the nature of self-conscious agency, while embedding these insights in a more complex and arguably more plausible account of motivation. The resultant theory of agency is considerably more sophisticated than has yet been appreciated.
|Keywords||Nietzsche Kant will agency reflection willing motivation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Locke (2008/1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Immanuel Kant (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.
Immanuel Kant (2007). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
Richard Holton (2009). Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Katsafanas (2012). Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (1):5-17.
Paul Katsafanas (2013). Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology. In John Richardson & Ken Gemes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford 727-755.
Garrath Williams (1999). Nietzsche's Response to Kant's Morality. Philosophical Forum 30 (3):201–216.
Paul Katsafanas (2011). The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller. Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (1):87-113.
Manuel Dries (2015). Freedom, Resistance, Agency. In Peter Kail & Manuel Dries (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Oxford University Press 142–162.
Mattia Riccardi (2010). Nietzsche's Critique of Kant's Thing in Itself. Nietzsche-Studien 39 (1):333-351.
Tsarina Doyle (2011). Nietzsche, Consciousness, and Human Agency. Idealistic Studies 41 (1-2):11-30.
Carl B. Sachs (2008). Nietzsche's Daybreak. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (1):81-100.
Paul Katsafanas (2011). Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 6. Oxford 219.
Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). The Problem of Normative Authority in Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. In Tom Bailey & João Constâncio (eds.), Nietzsche and Kantian Ethics.
R. Kevin Hill (2003). Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of His Thought. Oxford University Press.
Paul Katsafanas (2013). Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism. Oxford University Press.
Philip J. Kain (2004). Nietzsche, the Kantian Self, and Eternal Recurrence. Idealistic Studies 34 (3):225-238.
Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Philosophical Psychology as a Basis for Ethics. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (2):297-314.
Added to index2012-05-23
Total downloads79 ( #37,685 of 1,724,768 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #55,947 of 1,724,768 )
How can I increase my downloads?