David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In John Richardson & Ken Gemes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford 727-755 (2013)
Freud claimed that the concept of drive is "at once the most important and the most obscure element of psychological research." It is hard to think of a better proof of Freud's claim than the work of Nietzsche, which provides ample support for the idea that the drive concept is both tremendously important and terribly obscure. Although Nietzsche's accounts of agency and value everywhere appeal to drives, the concept has not been adequately explicated. I remedy this situation by providing an account of drives. I argue that Nietzschean drives are dispositions that generate evaluative orientations, in part by affecting perceptual saliences. In addition, I show that drive psychology has important implications for contemporary accounts of reflective agency. Contemporary philosophers often endorse a claim that has its origins in Locke and Kant: self-conscious agents are capable of reflecting on and thereby achieving a distance from their motives; therefore, these motives do not determine what the agent will do. Nietzsche's drive psychology shows that the inference in the preceding sentence is illegitimate. The drive psychology articulates a way in which motives can determine the agent's action by influencing the course of the agent's reflective deliberations. An agent who reflects on a motive and decides whether to act on it may, all the while, be surreptitiously guided by the very motive upon which he is reflecting. I show how this point complicates traditional models of the role of reflection in agency.
|Keywords||Nietzsche drive instinct philosophical psychology agency|
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Mark Alfano (2013). The Most Agreeable of All Vices: Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):767-790.
Robert Miner (2011). Nietzsche's Fourfold Conception of the Self. Inquiry 54 (4):337-360.
Simon Robertson (2011). Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits. Inquiry 54 (6):591 - 613.
Paul Katsafanas (2013). Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, Edited by ChristopherJanaway and SimonRobertson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, Ix + 262 Pp. ISBN 978-0-19-958367-6 Hb $75.00. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21:e9-e14.
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