Opioid Bliss as the felt hedonic core of mammalian prosociality – and of consummatory pleasure more generally?
Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):356-356 (2005)
|Abstract||Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky's (D&M-S's) language suggests that, unlike Kent Berridge, they may allow that the activity of a largely subcortical system, which is presumably often introspectively and cognitively inaccessible, constitutes affectively felt experience even when so. Such experience would then be phenomenally conscious without being reflexively conscious or cognitively access-conscious, to use distinctions formulated by the philosopher Ned Block.|
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